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Article 6

OPEN COURT
THE SELECTION OF JUDGES*

A committee of the Cleveland Bar Association has just made a
report which should stimulate thoughtful consideration of the problem by all members of the legal profession throughout the country.
The body of that report is as follows:
"A majority of the Committee are of the opinion that it is their
duty to recommend that system for the selection of judges in Ohio
which they believe to be the best, without regard to the question as
to whether or not it would be possible at this time to secure its adoption by the necessary changes in the Constitution and statutes of Ohio.
"After studying the problems involved, a majority of the Committee are of the opinion that practically all the judges of the Ohio courts
should be appointed and not elected, and that whatever changes in
the law may be necessary to bring this about should be made.
"This recommendation involves the duty of formulating and recommending the particular method of selecting judges, which, in the
judgment of the Committee, is most likely to secure the best appointments for the respective courts.
"A majority of the Committee accordingly submits to the Executive Committee the opinion that:
"1. The judges of the courts of Ohio should be appointed and
not selected by popular vote, except as noted below.
"2. A plan for the selection of judges, substantially as follows,
should be adopted:
"(a) The election of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court by
popular vote;
"(b) The appointment of associate judges of the Supreme Court
by the Governor, with the approval of two-thirds of the members of
the senate, or the approval of a Judicial Council selected by the Senate;
"(c) The appointment of judges of the appellate courts by the

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court with the approval of a majority
of the associate judges of the Supreme Court;
* Reprinted with permission of the Illinois Law Review.
Law Rev. 612 (February, 1927).
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"(d) The appointment of judges of all other courts by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, with the approval of the majority of
the judges of the appellate courts for the respective districts within
which the appointees are to serve;
"(e) Every judicial appointment to be for a term of six or eight
years."1
It is encouraging to find that lawyers, proverbially conservative and generally satisfied with whatever legal institutions they have
grown familiar with, are coming to realize that the failure of our
courts to function satisfactorily is largely due to the incapacity of
the judges; that the universal primary and popular election have
failed to produce judges with adequate professional training and
sufficient executive ability to deal with the increasing flood of litigation; and that mere tinkering with the election machinery is not apt
to produce substantial improvement. The voter cannot vote intelligently in the judicial primary because he cannot have personal
knowledge of the fitness of the candidates. He must either choose
blindly, or follow with equal blindness the advice of some self-constituted body of advisers.
In some of the older states where judges have always been appointed by the governor, and where the policy has long been established of appointing judges on the basis of fitness rather than political expediency, there can be no doubt that the result has been far
better than under popular election. Where no such tradition prevails, judicial appointments by the governor to fill vacancies have
frequently turned out to be quite as unsatisfactory as judges swept
into office by a popular landslide. The proposal to place the appointive power in the hands of an elected chief justice offers a plan
which might reasonably be expected to reduce the political factors
to a minimum in the selection of judges, and to hold out some
assurance that the selection would be based on merit and fitness.
E. W. HINTON
COMPROMISE AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

The following extract is from the opinion of the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in the case of Humphries v. Boxiey Bros. Co.
(1926) 135 S. E. 890, 891:
IThe full majority and minority reports have been printed in the Cleveland
Daily Legal News and Recorder. Copies may be secured through the Cleveland

Bar Ass'n., 348 New Court House, Cleveland, Ohio.
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"In 1918 the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed, which,
by express terms, included minors amohg the employees entitled to
its benefits. It is said to be in the nature of a compromise between
employer and employee to settle their differences arising out of personal injuries, but it is a compromise greatly to the advantage of the
employee. By it the question of the negligence of the employer is
eliminated, the common-law doctrines of the assumption of risk,
fellow servants, and contributory negligence are abolished, and the
rules of evidence are laxly enforced-so laxly that an award may
be made on hearsay evidence alone, if credible, and not contradicted.
The relief afforded is fixed, certain, and speedy, and at a time when
most needed. Under it there is no doubt or uncertainty as to the
right of recovery or the amount thereof. The damage resulting from
an accident is treated as a part of the expense of the business and
to be borne as such, as much as the expense of repairing a piece of
machinery which has broken down.
"In speaking of the compromise nature of such acts, it is said in
Stertz v. IndustrialIns. Commission, 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256, Ann.
Cas. 1918B, 354:
"'Both had suffered under the old system, the employers by heavy
judgments of which half was opposing lawyer's booty, the workmen
through the old defenses or exhaustion in wasteful litigation. Both
wanted peace. The master in exchange for limited liability was willing to pay on some claims in future where in the past there had been
no liability at all. The servant was willing not only to give up trial
by jury but to accept far less than he had often won in court, provided he was sure to get the small sum without having to fight for
it. All agreed that the blood of the workman was the cost of production, that the industry should bear the charge. * * To win only
after litigation, to collect only after the employment of lawyers, to
receive the sum only after months or years of delay, was to the
comparatively indigent claimant little better than to get nothing. The
workmen wanted a system entirely new. It is but fair to admit that
they had become impatient with the courts of law. They knew, and
both economists and progressive jurists were pointing out, what is
now generally conceded, that two generations .ought never to have
suffered from the baleful judgments of Abinger and Shaw.'"

